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woman’s place is in the home.” Like all axioms, this one
masks as much historical reality as it reveals. It certainly
encapsulates normative views that have been widely held
and underscores near ubiquitous identification of women with a
domestic sphere, but it does little to describe women’s actual and
changing activities or their impact on society as a whole.1 The
very positing of a distinctive place for women presupposes another
one, a place construed, perhaps, as the primary domain of men.
For feminists concerned about assessing women’s diverse and
changing roles in, and contributions to, their societies, both the
problems and the importance of a concept like “separate spheres”
lie at the heuristic and descriptive levels alike. As explanatory
or analytical categories, a “private sphere” distinct from, but
co-relatively linked to, a “public sphere”—as the spheres
could be named at their most generic level—has come to be
construed in so many different ways that they increasingly cause
misunderstanding among scholars.2 Such conceptual confusion
is only compounded when “the public” and “the private” come
to embrace, or to be aligned with, any number of conceptually
related contrastive binaries, such as the political v. the social,
the state v. the family, the political community v. the domestic
household, communal interests v. personal desires, the impersonal
v. the intimate or familial, the official v. the unofficial, the formal
v. the informal, the authoritative v. the merely influential, the
masculine v. the feminine. Yet however clearly defined, the terms
remain problematic at the descriptive level if they are treated as
unchanging universals. For each historical situation, considerable
care must be taken properly to describe not only the activities
that were assigned to each sphere, but also how contemporaries
construed the ways in which the spheres related to each other
and to associated concepts. Only then can significant comparisons
be made between women’s roles and how they were evaluated at
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diverse times and places, or, indeed, within different social classes
at any one time.
The purpose of this brief discussion is to suggest that
the distinction between “public” and “private” spheres remains
useful in understanding core differences between the political
powers of modern and medieval women—at least those medieval
women of noble birth married to men of the ruling aristocratic
elite3—and, in consequence, in appreciating how politically active
women would have been evaluated. This is the case for each of
the two main ways the concept has been deployed; namely, either
to encapsulate the contrast between sovereign states and society
or to point to a realm of informed public opinion that is poised
between government and domestic affairs. And the distinction
remains useful in comparing “medieval” and “modern” views of
women’s powers even if, for much of the patrimonial world of
the Middle Ages, the distinction between the spheres virtually
disappears, with much of the “public” sphere being subsumed
into the “private.” The result, at the descriptive level, is that
many activities of the aristocratic lordly elite that would be
classed as “public” in a modern context—including those related
to exercising jurisdiction or ruling over others—were effectively
“private” or “domestic” matters in the middle ages.4 Hence, to the
extent that female lords wielded the same powers as aristocratic
men and performed the same lordly deeds, their authoritative
powers could be considered equal to those of their male peers.5
In other words, at non-royal levels of lordship in
particular, no qualitative difference was drawn between the
authority with which noble women acted, or the legitimacy of
their lordly powers, when compared to those of aristocratic men.
It is thus anachronistic and inappropriate, when discussing the
“feudal society” of France as twentieth-century French historians
have construed that world, to view the lordly powers wielded
by women as somehow of a lower order or of lesser legitimacy
than those same powers when wielded by men. The domain of
women of the lordly elite—the spheres in which they exercised
dominion—included, in certain routinely occurring situations,
the exercise of authoritative jurisdictional powers over lands and
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men, and nothing struck contemporaries as extraordinary when
women wielded those powers in those contexts. Like men’s, the
measures they took could displease as well as please articulate
contemporaries, although, because women represented the marked
gender and there were fewer female lords than male ones, lordly
women’s actions tended to attract exaggerated praise or blame.
Still, however much such commendations or condemnations
might be linked to other traits deemed particularly feminine,
noblewomen’s capacity to act with lordly authority was not
denied.6 Since noblewomen came to lose their rights to “own”
and control property and to exercise jurisdiction over tenants
and others bound to them by the exchange of lands or rights and
oaths of fidelity or homage, these comments support the notion
that “modern” states were established at the expense of (some)
women’s rights.7 The failure of any woman to be accorded the
same rights to participate in new political institutions of liberal
or republican democratic states as fully as many men shows that
the process of building “modern” states was integrally linked to a
major reconceptualization both of “public” and “private” spheres
and of men and women as gendered human beings.
The first widely used sense of the distinction between
public and private spheres evoked above—that contrasting law and
governance to households and families—has long been entrenched
in historiographical traditions. It built on both the Aristotelian
separation of the oikos from the polis and the distinctions in
Roman law drawn between what pertains to particular individuals
and to the community as a whole. It was used by generations of
social theorists and historians to encapsulate the salient differences
between the impersonal bureaucratic government of modern
states, with their legally-defined institutions, officially-authorized
agents, and monopolies on legitimate violence, and patrimonial
societies that are structured largely by means of kinship ties,
personal lord-client bonds, seigneurial (lordly) jurisdiction, and
domestic or household-based economies.8
In this view, the “feudal” world is “private” by definition,
with the rights and powers of medieval lords (domini) derived in
part from the household roles and moral authority traditionally
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accorded to those of noble status. To those were added many
powers of command that “feudal” lords appropriated (not
always violently), as “private” individuals, from the portfolio of
“public powers” previously exercised for the common good by
governments headed by emperors and kings.9 Generations of
historians construed as “private law” the politically important
privileges that lords granted individuals and corporate groups, and
stressed the unofficial or uncertain legal standing of the informal
written compilations of orally transmitted customs embodying
the longstanding (though not immutable) traditions of folk
communities. Then they contrasted such customs to statutory
laws formally promulgated in writing and enforced by official
state authorities.10 The vast majority of the documents known
generically as charters—largely recording property exchanges
among the aristocratic elite, from modest knights to counts
and dukes as well as their clerical relations—continued to be
classed as “private acts” distinct from the “public acts” of the
royal governments of kings, even if they recorded transactions
of fundamental economic importance or relating to the feudal
relations between fief-giving lords and their men.11
The familial feuds (guerrae) over inheritances and single
combats or other forms of judicial self-help that played such
prominent roles in processing disputes were lumped together and
dismissed as mere “private war.” Like other family possessions,
honors—those bundles of lands, rights, and titles that constituted
the material base of the social prestige and political reach of the
ruling chivalric elite—were acquired largely through inheritance,
albeit according to distinctive rules, such as those governing the
transmission of those peculiar goods called fiefs. Indeed, the
integral link between one’s honor and one’s honors discloses
the extent to which the public domain of the state had come to
be subsumed into the domestic realm of dynastic families and
lordly households.12 With the exception of kings and a few major
princes, the military, fiscal, and judicial activities of the lordly
elite were deemed, in this view, to be sub-political: the selfinterested affairs of “private persons” meriting consideration as
meaningful, historically significant events only to the extent that
they contributed to the formation of modern states.
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At the heart of understanding the implications of
these views for noblewomen’s powers in France lies a problem
of translation: what English word best conveys to a modern
audience—on both sides of the Atlantic—the sense of the word
domina as understood in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries?
Domina, the feminine form of dominus, is most frequently
translated as “lady.” But does “lady” adequately convey the powers
and jurisdictional authority of the consorts of medieval lords?
Perhaps in the United Kingdom, where Lady is the title borne
by female members of a constitutionally empowered House of
Lords. But what are the authoritative powers of the wives of the
hereditary peers in that body? Ladies they may be, but in that
case the title refers to their elevated social status, not to any
jurisdictional authority as might be exercised by their husbands.
A lady may be deferred to, but not because of her lordly powers.
Indeed, in many other English-speaking countries, if “lady”
connotes anything specific, it is high social standing and perhaps
adherence to a certain code of behavior.13 Powers of command over
lands and people, such as wielded by medieval lords (domini), do
not enter the mental picture at all.
Yet noblewomen married to men of the ruling aristocratic
elite, in their roles as heads of households, consorts of lords,
and mothers of heirs, could find themselves wielding the same
lordly powers as their husbands and with the same wider-ranging
political consequences. Whether commanding household cooks,
household clerics, or household knights, the domina, or lady, of
the castle, was as much a lord (dominus) as her husband. When
she controlled lands, honors, and revenues in her own right
(whether as inheritances or marital assigns or both), or when she
acted as regent-guardian for an absent husband or minor son,
her lordly powers and political impact would often expand.14 But
because those activities, performed by wives as well as widows,
took place in what was effectively a domestic domain writ large,
they were viewed as natural extensions, not transgressions, of
noblewomen’s traditionally feminine and domestic social roles.
Ample evidence for such attitudes is found, for example, in letters
disclosing the manifold ways reforming clerics like Ivo of Chartres
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and Peter Damian treated matter-of-factly with the female lords
in their midst, or how a town like St Omer had written into its
charter of liberties the rights of the castellan’s wife to initiate
certain judicial proceedings in her husband’s stead.15 As Marc
Bloch eloquently declared, women in “feudal society” were never
deemed “incapable of exercising authority. No one was disturbed
by the spectacle of the great lady presiding over the baronial court
when her husband was away.”16
Granted, women’s rights to “own” or to hold real
property—i.e., their legal capacity in modern terms—are distinct
from their practical ability to dispose of it at will, but both
theoretical rights and actual control are important in gauging
women’s activities and how they were judged. A woman disposing
of property legally hers, or exercising customary jurisdiction
over her tenants, fief-holding knights and servile peasants alike,
can hardly be cast as a usurper of someone else’s rights. Women
in France during these centuries were never legally banned from
inheriting real property, whether after their parents’ death or
before, in the form of dowries. Noble daughters might routinely
be subordinated to their brothers in the inheritance of fiefs,
becoming their fathers’ principal heirs only when they had no
living brothers at the time of their fathers’ deaths. Yet they were
not excluded from inheriting fiefs and their inheritance shares in
non-feudal properties (i.e., allods) tended to be more equal to
their brothers’.17 The vast majority of wives had dower properties
from their husbands’ estates assigned to them when they married
and increasingly came to be endowed with dowries when they wed.
Dowries never replaced dowers in eleventh-to-thirteenth century
France, as they eventually would in some Mediterranean towns.18
Certainly, customs designed to protect women’s
rights from domineering men could be flouted, such as those
prohibiting a husband from alienating his wife’s property without
her consent, or a son from evicting his mother from her dower
estates. But such customs could not routinely be ignored, as is
disclosed in the records of judicial actions taken by French women
to reclaim their lands, which still await systematic study.19 At the
same time, however, the charters documenting wives alienating
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their own properties without reference to either their husbands
or their inheriting sons discloses that any custom granting men
sole control over women’s lands—and there is no formal trace
of one in French customary law of the eleventh to thirteenth
centuries—could likewise be flouted; analogues of coverture as
found in English Common Law developed unevenly and late
in French customary codes.20 Numerous, though not all, wives
who alienated property were acting in their husbands’ absence:
the communications technology of the day, the mobility of the
chivalric elite, and the size of many noble patrimonies regularly
placed wives in the position of having to take decisions in their
husbands’ stead. In addition, widowed guardians for minor heirs
were commonplace in most of the medieval French realm, where
any rights of lords—kings included—to control wards and their
fiefs never could be systematically enforced.21 At this time, when
first wives tended to be younger than their spouses, and the fathers
of their children suffered from the relatively high mortality rates
of men devoted to military pursuits, widow-guardians featured
routinely in the generational cycle of lordly families.22 Widows
could command the people and revenues of all of their husbands’
inherited estates, in addition to their dowers and dowries, and any
joint property acquired by the couple. Medieval dominae, without
deviating from their traditional domestic roles in aristocratic
households, had ample opportunity to wield lordly powers.
Furthermore, when comparing or contrasting the powers
of medieval lords and ladies it is too often forgotten that dominus
was not a legally-defined title conferred by official authority;
rather, it was a term of respectful address reflecting the deference
accorded to those powerful seniores (elders, seigneurs, lords) of
noble or common birth, who had come to constitute a ruling
elite.23 Freely bestowed upon them by their contemporaries,
dominus is thus an honorific title, even as it encapsulates the
powers over land and people—traditional and newly-acquired
alike—those men wielded. The repeated exercise of any new
powers, combined with the traditional rights of nobles, worked
to convert any de facto powers seized by such domini and their
knightly followers into socially-sanctioned, legitimate, customary
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authority that was eventually systematized as customs came to be
compiled in written form from the end of the twelfth century.24
But if dominus was essentially an honorific title, why
is domina so often dismissed as a “mere” honorific, with ladies
conceived largely as more or less efficient household managers or
“mere” ceremonial adjuncts of their powerful husbands? When
a knight or castle lord sought the authorization of his domina
to alienate fiefs he held from her, or sought judicial redress at
his domina’s court for properties he claimed were unjustly taken
from him, the domina he was adressing was his personal or
feudal lord in precisely the same sense that a dominus would have
been.25 And when the domina consented to his grant or presided
over the juridical proceedings whereby his goods were restored,
or when she ordered him to join the offensive campaigns of her
lord or directed him in the defense of her castle-residence, she
was exercising commonplace lordly prerogatives that could have
significant effects in the wider political community. For domini
and dominae alike, such prerogatives were rooted in a “domestic
domain” comprised of noble families and their inherited honors,
along with their households (familiae), clienteles of sworn men
(fideles), and other dependent tenants.
By the same token, it is too easy to forget that all titles,
even those like viscount or count, were not routinely conferred
on individuals by delegation from a higher authority (e.g., the
king) in these centuries, when no kingdom-wide hierarchy of
titles was defined in law.26 Like dominus, they, too, could be as
much traditional honorifics as badges of office. For example, count
(comes) could be used interchangeably with duke (dux) in many
contexts, even in relation to the dukes of Normandy. The title
comes could be borne as a status indicator by groups of brothers,
as was the case with the “counts of the Bretons,” even if only one
would inherit the bulk of the family’s patrimony.27 And, to note
one example among many, Rotrou, lord of Nogent and Mortagne,
sought the authorization of no higher authority—not the king of
France, not either of his immediate lords, the count of Blois or
the duke of Normandy—when he began to call himself “count of
Perche” in the later eleventh century.28 How then does the title
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the duke of Normandy—when he began to call himself “count of
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of countess differ from that of count? Both were honorifics and
both denoted the lordly powers wielded by the title-bearer. And
when countesses renounced privileges like the jus spolii (the right
to control episcopal goods during vacancies), collected dues like
the droit de gîte (hospitality), established markets, served monks
as their advocate, swore to enforce the Lord’s peace, ordered
their knights to fight, received homages from their sworn men,
or declared fiefs forfeit, they did so with the same authority as
counts, even if countesses took such actions less often than did
counts in France during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.
Some of those and related lordly powers appear, in
“common sense” terms, to be quite “public.” They concerned
the disposition of landed estates, the allocation of economic
resources, and feudal relations (in the strict sense of involving
fiefs and the relations among fief-holders and their fief-giving
lords). Authoritative measures taken by lordly women were often
enacted openly before, or in conjunction with, leading laymen
and clerics drawn from circles extending well beyond kin or
residential groups. Without doubt, the lordly deeds of women
could affect powerful men and have significant political effects in
wider regional—or even regnal—communities. Indeed, some of
the most important recent work in medieval women’s history is
the steady stream of studies that examine French noblewomen’s
surprisingly well-documented contributions to this extra-familial
world of lords’ courts, where disputes were settled, property
transactions authorized, political favors dispensed, and oaths
binding lords and followers exchanged.29
Drawing attention to the domestic grounding of the
powers of female lords is not meant to deny in any way the
important public consequences of lordly women’s deeds, when
‘public’ is understood in such a generic, common sense way.30
Rather, it is to make two further observations. The first is to
remind an academic readership that, however “public” the effects
of noblewomen’s lordly deeds, dominae performed them within
their socially-ascribed roles in aristocratic households and with
the same domestically-rooted, highly-personalized “traditional”
authority as was perceived to legitimate the lordly deeds of
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elite men. In other words, because of the central place of the
aristocratic household in the structures of political power at this
time, the powers of all medieval lords had a “private” domestic core
as well as a “public” political-jurisdictional face. Any historian who
posits a fundamental distinction between how power and authority
were exercised in a fundamentally “private”—patrimonial medieval
world from how they are construed in impersonal, “public”—
bureaucratic states will have to define very carefully what he or
she means by the “public powers” of any medieval lord—male or
female.31 But since both male and female lords in the middle ages
derived their authority from, and exercised their jurisdictional
powers within, a common “domestic domain,” to argue that the
socially-sanctioned powers of lords and ladies were qualitatively
different in kind risks a fall into self-contradiction, even if male
lords routinely exercised a wider range of such powers—most
notably, in military pursuits—than did their female peers.
Furthermore, evocation of lords’ courts leads directly
to the second technical sense in which a distinction between
“public” and “private” spheres has been deployed. As articulated
most prominently by Jürgen Habermas, the distinction refers to
the historically-situated emergence of a realm of informed public
opinion by non-noble, bourgeois members of society who could,
as groups of “private” individuals, come together to influence the
official actions of governing authorities in European monarchical
states.32 Although medievalists could argue that many preexisting conditions for the emergence of such a literate public
sphere date from the mid-thirteenth century (if not before),
their combination and particular force as motors of the social and
political changes leading to the development of “democratic” states
undeniably date to the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.33
Habermas’ historically-sensitive understanding—extended by
some feminist historians to embrace the women absent from his
account while deemed inadequate to that task by others34—does
not negate the first sense of distinct “public” and “private” spheres,
as discussed above, so much as it succeeds that conception in time,
as the sphere of governmental authority in Europe became more
depersonalized and bureaucratically complex.35 Examination of
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the “pre-modern” side of Habermas’ views discloses—as in the
previously-discussed distinction—a homology between the ruling
powers of women and men of the medieval aristocracy, with the
implication that contemporaries did not conceive of the powers
of non-royal lordly women as being any less authoritative or less
legitimate than the powers of non-royal lordly men.
The “Habermasian” sphere of public opinion resulting
from the growth of social institutions for the open exchange of
ideas among freely gathered groups of private individuals—what
might be called civil society distinct from the apparatus of
state—could not, by definition, exist in any meaningful way in the
central Middle Ages (even as aspects of it did). And, as Habermas
suggests, it might not continue to exist in the (post)modern
west. Yet even as he cautions against a looming “refeudalization”
of liberal democratic societies in the wake of the emergence of
unfettered “private” media monopolies, Habermas reveals the
continued conceptual importance of a contrast between “public”
organs of government designed to ensure the common good and
“private” parties (individuals and corporate groups), wielding
powers over others for their own advantage.36
In Habermas’ usage the sphere of public opinion is poised
between the official apparatus of government and the domestic—
or, family—life of free citizens, which is regulated by private law
enforced in state courts. In historical terms, when considering
how “governance” was organized, the operative contrast is between
the impersonal institutions of modern states and the personal rule
through royal or princely courts of earlier eras. In the medieval
world, according to Habermas, the legitimate authority to rule
others was displayed at court by those individuals—kings at first,
followed by princes and leading lords—who were perceived,
literally, to embody and re-present on earth the external and
legitimating authority of the sacred realm.37 In France, as kings’
powers faltered and local princes appropriated governing functions
in their regions, leading churchmen increasingly deployed notions
of Christian rulership traditionally used to authorize royal powers
to legitimate the ruling powers of the foremost lords and princes
of the realm. Enjoined to enforce justice and keep the peace in
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their domains, local lords played essential governing roles at their
level in the hierarchy of earthly authority established by God.
Since their jurisdictional authority was held to flow from the same
divine source as made kings, medieval lords imitated and adapted
ceremonial practices used at royal courts to display their majestic,
ruling dignity.38
Within this schema, female lords unquestionably played
important roles in the ceremonial representation of authoritative
powers at lords’ courts, such as have been eloquently evoked
for twelfth-century France by Frederic Cheyette in his study of
Ermengard, vicountess of Narbonne.39 But women could also
embody and re-present that very divinely-ordained authority
itself—i.e., display “representative publicness” in Habermas’
terms—when they wielded lordly powers in the absence of
requisite men. A telling example of a female lord represented as
embodying such ruling authority is the extensive, though often
anachronistically interpreted, verse-epistle extolling the virtue
of clemency that the poet-prelate Hildebert of Lavardin, when
bishop of Le Mans, directed in the opening decade of the twelfth
century to Adela, then ruling as countess of Blois, Chartres, and
Meaux.
Hildebert opened by describing the widowed countess
not only as a woman who ruled a county, but also as ruler
who administered so capably on her own that she stood as an
exemplar of all that he deemed necessary for governing a realm.40
Attributing such praiseworthy qualities to God’s grace rather than
to her nature, Hildebert proceeded to use the countess’ female
gender to construct a series of anaphoric antitheses contrasting
the personal virtue of chastity to the socio-political virtue
of clemency, while accenting Adela’s position as a ruler who
embodied both:
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To Hildebert there was no doubt that clemency is the greater
good because it benefits more people; in his words, “modesty
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You lay aside what is female when you cultivate
chastity in beauty; you restrain the countess when
you retain clemency in power. Chastity reconciles
one man to you; clemency, the people. Through
chastity you acquire a good name; through
clemency, favor and support.41
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allows comely ones to look after themselves; mercy in ruling
preserves the safety of the realm.”42
Clemency, however, is a virtue only of the powerful, who
legitimately come to rule over others by the socially-acknowledged
means of either inheritance, or selection, or the just use of force
to assert rightful but contested claims. As Hildebert expounded
upon his theme, clemency becomes a specifically human virtue
because it depends on the exercise of reason and binds society
together; it thus distinguishes persons from beasts and links
rulers in the exercise of their judicial prerogatives to the wisdom
and mercy of God. It is the most humane and glorious attribute
of princes, as he demonstrated with a catena of quotations from
classical authors. Acts of clemency, not cruelty, allow powerful
princes to prosper.
In this erudite verse-epistle directed to Adela’s court,
the bishop of Le Mans presented a countess to his informed
readership as the perfect embodiment of a divinely appointed ruler
exercising power over self and others, in order to emphasize the
benefits to social order of rational and clement rule by lords of any
rank or gender. He may well have sketched an idealized portrait
of Adela’s lordly self-control (she is known to have inflicted harsh
punishments and resorted to violence when angered),43 but he
was writing to a prince whose powers he freely acknowledged and
whose behavior he—as a guardian of Christian morality and selfappointed advisor—hoped to moderate. Yet his comments have
all too frequently been taken to imply that Hildebert regarded
a ruling woman as somehow unnatural, since he asserted that
the countess owed her lordly powers to divine grace rather than
to her feminine nature. But do his comments really mean that,
whereas it took divine intervention to make women rulers, men,
in contrast, were natural rulers, as several modern commentators
have claimed?44
The antithesis of nature and grace was a commonplace
to medieval theologians, and recourse to it almost a reflex to
explain a variety of apparent paradoxes. Axiomatic was the
acknowledgment that all human nature was vitiated by sin so that
only an act of grace could save individual men and women. The
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redeemed of both sexes, once sinful humans by nature, could
be considered “gods by grace” as distinct from the one “God by
nature.”45 By the same token, the sin-free but human savior,
“divine by nature,” could only be “human by grace,” as one of
Hildebert’s neighbors expressed the miracle of the incarnation.
But in medieval theological reflection, the nature/grace antithesis
had one particular application: to explain the powers and special
sacrosanctity of anointed rulers. Kings had by grace what Christ
(the king) had by nature, and were thus empowered to act as
God’s agents on earth.46 Not all men were kings and it took an act
of grace to make a king.
Adela, of course, was not an anointed lord, but neither
was her husband, who, like many other French princes, claimed to
exercise comital authority “by the grace of God.”47 Significantly,
Hildebert evoked the antithesis of nature and grace in the context
of Adela’s ruling powers: it was her lordly, comital powers that
were conferred by divine grace. Authoritative ruling powers were
not hers—or any person’s, man or woman—by nature. That God
also bestowed on Adela the power (virtus) that allowed her to
remain chaste was perhaps an added bonus in Hildebert’s mind,
but her chastity was a personal—if peculiarly feminine—virtue,
distinct from, and of less importance than, her power to punish
others (potestas puniendi), which this prelate clearly hoped the
countess would not exercise unreasonably.
The antithesis of nature v. grace explained all princes’
powers, including Adela’s. Hildebert then artfully harnessed the
antithesis of the feminine as personal and carnal v. the masculine
as public and rational to suggest that princely clemency was a
greater virtue for all legitimate rulers than was personal chastity.48
Ruling a county, in his commonplace clerical view, depended as
much on mental as on bodily endowments, and the human ability
to reason allowed good princes both to control their emotions
and to rule others as the merciful God would have them do. If the
female Adela, represented as embodying all worldly goodness in
moral and political terms alike, could control both self and others
through reason, how much more powerful would be her example
to her male peers?
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Hildebert’s letter shows that he took for granted the
gender asymmetry of his era—women were not men’s equals
in his eyes—even as he freely acknowledged the lordly capacity
and abilities of one noted, but far from unique, female ruler
of his day.49 God most frequently granted the capacity to rule
others to male lords, although in certain regularly and naturally
arising situations, he also granted it to princes who happened
to be female. Even women could come to embody the sacred
authority divinely conferred on rulers and to represent God’s
will in the temporal realm. Although, in Habermas’ view, such
“representative publicness” inhering in individual “feudal” lords
did not constitute a fully public sphere of governance that could
be distinguished from lords’ personal status, attributes, and landed
possessions, the ideological grounding of all lordly authority in
the mind of a divine Lord who vowed to make the last first made
ruling women a readily explicable phenomenon.50
To conclude: feminists interested in assessing the powers
of aristocratic women in eleventh- to thirteenth-century France
and evaluating them as they would have been viewed by their
male peers would do well to realize that the two most widespread
ways in which historians have deployed a distinction between
“public” and “private” spheres do not apply directly to the central
Middle Ages. Yet understanding why they do not discloses certain
key differences between the medieval and modern worlds. One
distinguishing feature is the fundamental homology in the Middle
Ages between the lordly powers of noblewomen and elite men
that would disappear in the erection of modern, democratic states.
Those lordly powers were wielded largely in a familial or domestic
context by men and women alike, even as their exercise could have
important consequences in wider political communities. At the
same time they were ideologically grounded in a divine will that
was believed to have established hierarchies of authority in which
noblewomen ranked above most non-noble men. Male lords
outnumbered female lords and usually exercised the prerogatives
of lordly rule for longer periods of their lives. Nonetheless,
the women who wielded lordly powers and controlled their
own properties, either at certain regularly occurring phases in

Hildebert’s letter shows that he took for granted the
gender asymmetry of his era—women were not men’s equals
in his eyes—even as he freely acknowledged the lordly capacity
and abilities of one noted, but far from unique, female ruler
of his day.49 God most frequently granted the capacity to rule
others to male lords, although in certain regularly and naturally
arising situations, he also granted it to princes who happened
to be female. Even women could come to embody the sacred
authority divinely conferred on rulers and to represent God’s
will in the temporal realm. Although, in Habermas’ view, such
“representative publicness” inhering in individual “feudal” lords
did not constitute a fully public sphere of governance that could
be distinguished from lords’ personal status, attributes, and landed
possessions, the ideological grounding of all lordly authority in
the mind of a divine Lord who vowed to make the last first made
ruling women a readily explicable phenomenon.50
To conclude: feminists interested in assessing the powers
of aristocratic women in eleventh- to thirteenth-century France
and evaluating them as they would have been viewed by their
male peers would do well to realize that the two most widespread
ways in which historians have deployed a distinction between
“public” and “private” spheres do not apply directly to the central
Middle Ages. Yet understanding why they do not discloses certain
key differences between the medieval and modern worlds. One
distinguishing feature is the fundamental homology in the Middle
Ages between the lordly powers of noblewomen and elite men
that would disappear in the erection of modern, democratic states.
Those lordly powers were wielded largely in a familial or domestic
context by men and women alike, even as their exercise could have
important consequences in wider political communities. At the
same time they were ideologically grounded in a divine will that
was believed to have established hierarchies of authority in which
noblewomen ranked above most non-noble men. Male lords
outnumbered female lords and usually exercised the prerogatives
of lordly rule for longer periods of their lives. Nonetheless,
the women who wielded lordly powers and controlled their
own properties, either at certain regularly occurring phases in

27

27

the ‘natural’ life cycle of aristocratic families or in their absent
husbands’ or sons’ stead, did so legitimately as active agents,
not as placeholding ciphers passively transmitting lands and
rights between men. Whether authoritatively ruling or “merely”
participating alongside their husbands in court rituals designed
to display lordly authority, noblewomen came to embody and
re-present the sacred source of the powers they could both share
with men and exercise legitimately independently of them.
Their customary rights to inherit and control real
property, to exercise jurisdiction over feudal and servile
tenants, and to serve as guardians and regents for minor heirs
drew significant numbers of medieval French women directly
and legitimately into the realms of politics and governance
as construed in their day. Such “lordly powers” of French
noblewomen are substantively different both from the “social
powers” of the wives of England’s modern-day hereditary peers,
and from the “official” voting rights and eligibility to hold
elective offices that were long denied all women in modern
democratic states. Medieval noblewomen and modern bourgeois
women exercised important powers from within their domestic
domains. The significant difference is that in medieval centuries
the “domestic sphere” included many undertakings that today
would be placed in the domain of governance and authoritative
rule over lands and persons. In modern times such activities came
to be defined in laws that formally denied all women direct and
legitimate access to a separate, legally-enshrined, “public sphere”
of official state government.
National University of Ireland, Galway
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of case studies of such dominae in France, with guides to further reading. It
can be supplemented by Cheyette, Ermengard; Erin L. Jordan, Women, Power,
and Religious Patronage in the Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan,
2006); Kimberly A. LoPrete, Adela of Blois: Countess and Lord (c. 1067-1137)
(Dublin: Four Courts, 2007); and Theodore Evergates, The Aristocracy in the
County of Champagne, 1100-1300 (Philadelphia: U of Pennyslvania P, 2007).
15. For letters, see LoPrete, “The Gender of Lordly Women,” pp. 99-103,
and Kimberly A. LoPrete, “Gendering Viragos: Medieval Perceptions of
Powerful Women,” in Studies of Medieval and Early Modern Women 4: Victims
or Viragos?, ed. Christine Meek and Catherine Lawless (Dublin: Four Courts,
2005), pp. 17-38; pp. 30-31. See also Georges Espinas, “Le privilège de SaintOmer de 1127,” Revue du Nord 29 (1947): 43-49, p. 47; clause 20 opens: “If
any foreigner attacks a burgher of Saint-Omer and inflicts insult or injury on
him or violently robs him, avoids arrest, and gets away with his transgression,
and afterwards he is summoned by the Castellan or his wife, or by his standardbearer (postmodum vocatus a castellano vel uxore eius seu ab eius dapifero),
and refuses or neglects to appear within three days to do satisfaction, the
community of citizens shall avenge their brother’s injury.” Trans. Constantin
Fasolt in Readings in Western Civilization, Vol. 4: Medieval Europe, ed. Julius
Kirshner and Karl F. Morrison (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986), pp. 90-95; see
further in LoPrete, “Women,” p. 1926.
16. Bloch, Feudal Society, p. 200; Bloch’s views contrast with those of Duby,
whose paradoxical formulations are discussed in LoPrete, “Women,” pp. 192426. Note also, regarding queens: “The governmental activity of the queen [as
one member of a Capetian trinity] included all forms of rule. One swore fidelity
to her as one did to the king. She, like him, had the right to issue safe conducts,
and she exercised executive power with him” (Luchaire, Histoire, 1:149).
17. See, for overviews derived largely from significantly later customaries, John
Gilissen, “Le privilège de masculinité dans le droit coutumier de la Belgique
et du nord de la France,” Revue du Nord 43 (1961): 201-216; and Jean Yver,
“Les caractères originaux du groupe de coutumes de l’ouest de la France,”
Revue historique de droit français et étranger, 4th ser., 30 (1952): 18-79, who
notes that prohibitions on daughters who had received a “pre-mortem” share
of their fathers’ estates in the form of dowries from inheriting more emerged
only in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and only in some regions.
Sound regional summations include Cheyette, Ermengard, pp. 25-35, 370-71;
Evergates, Aristocracy, pp. 82-139, 318-51. The so-called Salic Law, “invented”
in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries, applied only to kings’ daughters and left
unchanged the inheritance rights of other noblewomen, even as it marked the
growing tendency to conceptualize monarchs as heads of State (see LoPrete,
“Historical Ironies,” p. 281, and LoPrete “Women,” pp. 1926-27).
18. In addition to the works cited in previous note, see discussion in LoPrete,
Adela, pp. 53-4; and Diane Owen Hughes, “From Brideprice to Dowry in
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Mediterranean Europe,” Journal of Family History 3 (1978): 13-58, an article
whose findings too often have been inappropriately overgeneralized.
19. For consent, see discussion in LoPrete, Adela, pp. 84-88; Evergates,
Aristocracy, pp. 91-3, 110-11.
20. See examples in LoPrete, Adela, pp. 96-101, 133, 308-311; Evergates,
Aristocracy, pp. 94-6, 106-7, 113-15. The first customary codes appeared in the
closing decades of the twelfth century (van Dievoet, Les coutumiers, pp. 24-36;
47-58); see also the works cited in n. 17.
21. Yver, “Les caractères originaux,” pp. 40-41; Pierre Petot, “Le mariage des
vassales,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger 4th ser., 56 (1978): 29-47;
Evergates, Aristocracy, pp. 24-26, 37-42, 98-100, 156-7.
22. See LoPrete, Adela, p. 89; LoPrete, “Women,” pp. 1926-27; Evergates,
Aristocracy, pp. 128-9, 140-66, 348, 351-56.
23. See Duby, La société, and the works cited in n. 3.
24. These customaries represent the legitimization of lords’ powers, but how
they affected the authoritative rights of lordly women (compared to lordly
men’s) is difficult to assess for several reasons. Of the two most important, one
is the unofficial standing of most of the earliest compilations, which means that
they cannot be read simply as guides to normative practices. The second is that
it cannot be determined definitively which provisions reflected long-established
“traditional” usages and which were of recent coinage, or even effectively
new. In addition to the works cited in n. 10, the pathbreaking essays in Peter
Classen, ed., Recht und Schrift im Mittelalter, Vortäge und Forschungen,
no. 23 (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1977) remain useful for understanding
the relationship between oral and written legal traditions; for a magisterial
discussion of recent work in the Frankish realms and post-Carolingian Europe
see Patrick Wormald, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth
Century, vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 29-92.
25. See, for example, Kimberly A. LoPrete, “Adela of Blois: Familial Alliances
and Female Lordship,” in Aristocratic Women, pp. 27-29; Amy Livingstone,
“Aristocratic Women in the Chartrain,” in Aristocratic Women, pp. 61-67.
26. Bloch, Feudal Society, p. 335; Walther Kienast, “Comes Francorum und
Pfalzgraf von Frankreich,” in Festgabe für Paul Kirn zum 70. Geburtstag, ed.
Ekkehard Kaufmann (Berlin: E. Schmidt, 1961), pp. 80-92.
27. See LoPrete, Adela, pp. 183-87; and pp. 65-66 for the title as used by
members of the Thibaudian family that controlled the counties of Blois,
Chartres, Meaux and Troyes.
28. Kathleen Thompson, Power and Border Lordship in Medieval France: The
County of the Perche, 1000–1226 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2002), pp. 37-8; note
also Robert, “count” of Braine and Dreux in the early thirteenth century, as
cited by Theodore Evergates, ed. and tr., Feudal Society in Medieval France:
Documents from the County of Champagne (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P,
1993), p. 6.
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